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A sort of machine à gouverner is thus now essentially in operation on
both sides of the world conflict, although it does not consist in either case
of a single machine that makes policy, but rather of a mechanistic
technique which is adapted to the exigencies of a machine-like group of
men devoted to the formation of policy.
—Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (1950) 1
Abstract:
This article examines science fictional allegorizations of Soviet-style
planned economies, financial markets, autonomous trading algorithms, and
global capitalism writ large as nonhuman artificial intelligences, focusing
primarily on American science fiction of the Cold War period. Key fictional
texts discussed include Star Trek, Isaac Asimov’s Machine stories, Terminator,
Kurt Vonnegut’s Player Piano (1952), Charles Stross’s Accelerando (2005),
and the short stories of Philip K. Dick. The final section of the article discusses
Kim Stanley Robinson’s novel 2312 (2012) within the contemporary political
context of accelerationist anticapitalism, whose advocates propose working
with “the machines” rather than against them.

“Financial markets, by and large,” notes Manuel Castells, “are
outside anyone’s control. They have become a sort of automaton, with
sudden movements that do not follow a strict economic logic, but a

1

Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1954), 182.
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logic of chaotic complexity.”2 But this chaos is not the same as
randomness; rather, it is “chaos” in the spirit of “chaos theory,” the
strange loops and fractal patterns that emerge out of a sensitive
dependence on starting conditions. Movements that may appear
random or arbitrary on the local level contribute to this higher-order
totality. “We live in a world of crises and convulsions; but this does not
mean that our world is anarchic, or devoid of logic,” writes Steven
Shaviro along precisely these lines. “If anything, the contemporary
world is ruthlessly organized around an exceedingly rigid and
monotonous logic. […] All impulsions of desire, all structures of feeling,
and all forms of life, are drawn into the gravitational field, or captured
by the strange attractor, of commodification and capital
accumulation.”3 Such pronouncements apply a twenty- first century
scientific register to Adam Smith’s familiar figuration of the “invisible
hand,” in which the self-interested actions of each individual actor
scale to “promote an end which was no part of his intention.”4 The end
result of the “rigid and monotonous logic” of the chaotic movements of
capital is the production of what appears to us as a kind of emergent
intelligence, a non-biological subject that seems to think, though
sometimes perhaps not all that well—a subject we sometimes
apprehend as a perfectly rational calculator of values and other times
as an irrational, highly “jittery” subject “with moods and volitions of its
own.”5 Borrowing her terms from thinkers working in the philosophy of
mind, N. Katherine Hayles has proposed the term “cognitive
nonconscious” to describe the kind of unthinking decision-making
agents, like markets, that arise as an emergent property out of
systems of complex interactions. A market, Hayles notes, much like a
biological organism, is adaptive and flexible; while not being selfaware, it nonetheless possesses a kind of cognition, with “sensing,
processing, communicating, and actuating capabilities that surpass or
in fact bypass human agency.”

2

Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 87. Quoted in Shaviro, Connected, below.
3

Steven Shaviro, Post Cinematic Affect (Washington: Zero Books, 2010), 131.

4

Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Digireads Publishing, 2004), 264.

5

Steven Shaviro, Connected, or What It Means to Live in a Network Society (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 41.
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The genre of speculative fiction (SF)6 has long given us the
terms and tropes to think about such nonhuman, even non-conscious
“minds”—and, indeed, the vocabulary of SF is typically an unavoidable
reference in any conversation that seeks to take seriously the
possibility of nonhuman agents acting in the world. This article
therefore takes up science fiction’s treatment of markets as an
emergent intelligence as a terrain for thinking through the sorts of
worlds such market intelligences might produce. I link the way U.S.
science fiction has historically imagined such intelligences to two
moments in which such speculations have gained particular
prominence: the mid-twentieth-century Cold War and its attendant,
intertwined anxieties about totalitarianism and planned economies,
and the contemporary neoliberal transformation of the economy via
technological disruption and governmental deregulation. These visions
of autonomous, agential economies gain particular urgency in our
time, in which these once-fantastic science fictions are becoming more
and more real; our automated cognitive systems exist in an
accelerating “self-catalyzing feedback loop” with the accumulation of
faster- than-human information-gathering, decision-making, and
transaction-execution, catapulting the market system’s outcomes
further and further from the realm of human comprehensibility, much
less intervention or control.7

“What We Call Freedom”
One of the more archetypal Star Trek (1966-1969) story
templates is the society (usually pastoral or primitivist) that is in thrall
to a giant supercomputer (far beyond its apparent level of technology)
which it reveres as a god, and whose inscrutable calculations organize
every level of its civilization. This is, typically, a pretty good deal for
the planetary culture: the computer ensures both social stability and
individual happiness, and provides a certain level of material
prosperity at or near the level of “paradise” with little or no violence or
exploitation. But despite these benefits, the situation invariably

6

While some scholars find it useful to draw fine distinctions between science fiction, speculative
fiction, SF, and other proposed names for the genre, for my purposes here I will use all three
terms interchangeably.
7

See Hayles’s talk “Material Processes & the Cognitive Nonconscious,” available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iDL9yDH4ko#t=58.
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offends Captain Kirk’s sense of human dignity, and so at the end of the
episode he always destroys the machine, either by blowing it up
directly or by exposing the computer to some does-not-compute
logical paradox that causes it to malfunction or explode.
A quintessential version of this story is “The Apple” (1967), from
early in the second season, which explicitly (and repeatedly, almost to
the point of exhaustion) links the pastoral society that Kirk chooses to
destabilize with the Garden of Eden.8 The planet, as usual, is said to be
a paradise, with temperature regulation in the tropical range all the
way from the equator to the poles. The inhabitants not only have all
their needs provided for, but also show no sign of disease or aging; Dr.
McCoy can’t tell if they are 20 or 20,000 years old. Food, shelter,
clothing, immortality—everything is provided for and administered by
the god-computer Vaal.
The stagnation implied by this “perfection” horrifies McCoy:
“There are certain absolutes, Mr. Spock, and one of them is the right
of humanoids to a free and unchained environment—the right to have
conditions that permit growth. … There's been no progress here in at
least ten thousand years. This isn't life. It's stagnation.” (Spock’s
retort that another absolute is a society’s “right to choose a system
which seems to work for them” goes unanswered.) In the end, of
course, Kirk sides with McCoy, destroys the planetary god-computer
that has organized all aspects of this society since time immemorial,
and then gathers the people together to congratulate them on their
new freedom:
ALIEN MAN: But it was Vaal who put the fruit on the trees,
caused the rain to fall. Vaal cared for us.
KIRK: You'll learn to care for yourselves, with our help. And
there's no trick to putting fruit on trees. You might enjoy it. You'll
learn to build for yourselves, think for yourselves, work for
yourselves, and what you create is yours. That's what we call
freedom. You'll like it, a lot. And you'll learn something about men

8

Star Trek, “The Apple,” directed by Joseph Pevney (1967; Hollywood, CA, 2008: Paramount),
Netflix. The original series crew encounters similar god-computers in “The Return of the
Archons,” “For the World Is Hollow and I Have Touched the Sky,” “Shore Leave,” and “Spock’s
Brain,” among others; the crew themselves are threatened with replacement by an autonomous
artificial intelligence in “The Ultimate Computer.”
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and women, the way they're supposed to be. Caring for each
other, being happy with each other, being good to each other.
That's what we call love. You'll like that, too, a lot. You and your
children.
ALIEN WOMAN: What are children?
KIRK: The little ones? Look like you? Just go on the way
you're going. You'll find out.
The conflict between Kirk’s vision of radical freedom /
backbreaking labor and Vaal’s offer of absolute security /
infantilization—and all its many variations in the Star Trek canon and
across Cold War SF more generally—plainly allegorizes the Cold War
dispute between the “free market” of the West and the planned
economy of Soviet-style communism. Friedrich Hayek could very well
have quoted from McCoy’s speech in this episode when he warns, in
his own 1967 Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, that “If
the human intellect is allowed to impose a preconceived pattern on
society, if our powers of reasoning are allowed to lay claim to a
monopoly of creative effort… then we must not be surprised if society,
as such, ceases to function as a creative force.”9 (Of course other
markers in the episode point us strongly in the direction of Cold War
allegory as well, from the Vietnam-like jungle appearance of the planet
to Ensign Chekov’s remarkable assertion, early in the episode, that the
Garden of Eden was “just outside Moscow.”) In these terms the
episode’s moral is somewhat stunning: communism, Star Trek seems
to be warning us, might make you happy, but it won’t make you good.
The ideological hostility to a planned economy is so powerful that the
episode’s ending gag somehow transfers the “Satanic” character of the
Fall myth to Spock (who throughout the episode has advocated that
the People of Vaal simply be left alone), even though within the logic
of the tale it’s plainly Kirk who has played that disruptive, paradisedestroying role. In this retelling of Genesis the snake was running the
Garden, and God was somewhere outside; it’s little wonder that Kirk
wants to shift the reference from Genesis to Exodus near the end of
the episode, commanding his security officers to “let those people go”
after Vaal is safely destroyed.

9

F.A. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (London: Routledge, 1967; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967), 247.
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A surface reading of “The Apple” thus transfers the very idea of
economic forethought (however flawed or noble) onto the fantasy of a
monstrous, fully alien system, utterly out of human control and utterly
unaccountable to any human intervention, which can only be
experienced as slavery-like constraint. From this perspective it’s no
surprise that the People of Vaal are presented as if they are unable to
live recognizably human lives at all while under the power of the
machine; note that it falls to Kirk to give to them the (foundationally
human) gifts of sex and parenthood. That Vaal is in fact successful at
providing for a happy population—and that the People of Vaal don’t
experience Vaal as oppressive—doesn’t figure into Kirk’s analysis at
all, and if anything is only proof of the dangerous seductivity of
unfreedom. In this episode and others, the inhumanity of a controlled
economy gives Kirk the moral obligation to free culture after culture
from this kind of domination, even if (as is certainly the case in “The
Apple”) the tiny culture was perfectly happy before he arrived, and
indeed seems to have absolutely no hope of surviving outside Vaal’s
guidance: the tribe has neither the population size nor the collective
knowledge to fend for itself. That offhand “with our help” in Kirk’s
speech consequently becomes extremely important; Spock’s repeated
reminders of Star Trek’s famously violable “Prime Directive” of noninterference go completely unheeded in the face of McCoy and Kirk’s
patronizing gunboat colonialism, which successfully opens up Gamma
Trianguli Six to Federation “help” it had absolutely no need for before
the Enterprise arrived.
The irony is that, when taken to this extreme, the “planetary god”
allegory for a planned economy inadvertently doubles as an allegory
for the so-called “invisible hand” of the free market system as well.
The market is similarly out of human control, and similarly
unaccountable to human intervention; we are told, in fact, that the
market’s brutal, unflinching efficiency is the chief argument in its
favor. Paradoxically, here Hayek becomes in favor of an economic
system’s inscrutable authority, even as it once again completely
swamps the effort or rational designs of any individual: “Many of the
greatest things man has achieved are not the result of consciously
directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately
coordinated effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the
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individual plays a part which he can never fully understand.”10 The
spontaneous organization of market forces as they emerge,
evolutionarily, from the salutary or maladaptive decisions of individual
actors within the system is no less definitive than the deliberate
decisions of a planned economy; market hegemony is thus revealed as
itself a kind of totalitarianism, simply a benign one, an authoritarian
logic that Hayek finds desirable because it represents a “combination
of knowledge more extensive than a single mind can master.”11
Precisely as with the once-lamented unfreedom of the planned
economy of the infernal god-machine, neither the individual or the
collective have any ability to choose against this emergent
intelligence’s automatic determinations of what is good. Hayek himself
concedes this paradox in an essay from 1945: “This is not a dispute
about whether planning is to be done or not. It is a dispute as to
whether planning is to be done centrally, by one authority for the
whole economic system, or is to be divided among many individuals.”12
The same irresistible determinative force that crushed freedom and
growth somehow becomes a beneficent guiding hand when it is
massively distributed and automatic rather than centralized and
deliberate.
Indeed, in our time, even more that during the original run of
Star Trek, it is the market that is now personified as a calculating god
that processes all data and makes all judgments better than any
individual human—the market whose decisions are always final, even
when they conflict with our notions of justice, ethics, value, happiness,
or ecological sustainability. In our time it is the market that famously
“speaks,” and we who must listen. This takes us a step beyond even
Wiener’s “machine-like group of men devoted to the formation of
policy” to something even more insidiously cybernetic; in the
neoliberal moment, the ambition is that the machine of the market
make policy directly, without any soft-hearted human intervention that
10

F.A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), 149-150. The
essay from which the quote originates was originally printed between 1942 and 1944 as
“Scientism and the Study of Society” in Economica 9 (1942): 267-291; Economica 10 (1943): 3463; and Economica 11 (1944): 27-29.
11

Ibid.

12

F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35, no. 4: 519-30.
Accessed online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html.
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might compromise the market’s efficiency or effectivity. The free
market in this way can thus be seen as an immense, massively
distributed, quasi-sentient hyperobject, one that might as well be selfaware whether that’s literally or provably so—a god-computer even
more abstruse and monstrous than the old Soviet version, which for all
its multiple and myriad flaws was (if only in name) directed towards
the provision of human welfare.
As Fredric Jameson has said of the inseparability of contemporary
“transnational finance capitalism” and “cybernetics and the computer,”
especially as it manifests in both contemporary cyberpunk fantasy and
in the (im)material reality of wealth extraction in the digital age:

As for planning, socialist or otherwise, what could be more
complexly post- human than the attempt to direct the
multiplicities of contemporary production and consumption, of the
labor market, of investment and ecology? Clearly, it is the
computer which is central to this version of imaginary economics:
what Soviet planning so desperately lacked, finance capital can be
said to have diverted for its own unproductive purposes.13

This episode of Star Trek therefore offers a first version of the
conceit at the heart of this article: the extent to which the
contemporary global economy—which we understand to be
autonomous in its operation, emerging as an agent out of the
undirected decisions of free individuals—can be figured as an machine
intelligence working against rather than for human ends.
Contemporary finance capital, divorced from any rational relationship
to human labor or material constraint and totally out of human control,
becomes revealed in this way as a dangerously alien “artificial
intelligence” opposed to the needs of human beings—not on some
distant planet in some improbable future, but here and now in our
present.

13

Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 163.
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Financial Speculation and Speculative Fiction
The god-computer Vaal serves as a flexible allegory that
includes both the Soviet and the American versions of the larger
world-system, here localized in an individual agent that Kirk can
confront and destroy in the name of “freedom.” This mode of
allegorization is a common technique in science fiction. Steven Shaviro
has even argued that science fiction is one of our “best tools” for
“psycho-socio-technological cartography” of hyperobjects “that are so
out of scale with regard to our immediate experience that we find
them almost impossible to grasp”—a means to “feel the effects of
these hyperobjects … intimately and viscerally, on a human and
personal scale, contained within the boundaries of a finite narrative.”14
The capital-M Market— that emergent, Hayekian totality generated by
the individual decisions made in all the many micromarkets—is
something we are unable to process in its own terms; we can begin to
see it in only when filtered through the kind of cognitive mapping that
Jameson, in his essay on Ursula K. Le Guin’s science fiction, calls
“world-reduction”:

a principle of systematic exclusion, a kind of surgical
excision of empirical reality, something like a process of
ontological attenuation in which the sheer teeming multiplicity of
what exists, of what we call reality, is deliberately thinned and
weeded out through an operation of radical abstraction and
simplification.15

We can understand the global market’s cybernetic nature, that
is, more easily and more directly as the science-fictional fantasy of a
literal god-computer than as the incomprehensibly vast and massively
distributed network of human nodes interacting with state monetary
policies, banking and investment infrastructures, automated financial
14

Steven Shaviro, “Hyperbolic Futures: Speculative Finance and Speculative Fiction,” The
Cascadia Subduction Zone 1.2 (April 2011): 3-6 (4). For hyperobjects, see Timothy Morton,
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2013).
15

Jameson, Archaeologies, 271.
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systems, local ecologies, and on and on. To put it another way,
thinking about the god-computers that don’t exist is always really a
way of thinking about the global Market that actually does. But the
Market’s affinity with SF goes well beyond the latter’s incredible
usefulness as a tool for world-reduced allegorization. “The speculative
mode,” notes Aimee Bahng, “with a keen awareness of time out of
joint, seems particularly well-situated to trace the movements of
capitalism as it becomes increasingly invested in predicting “futures”
and banking on uncertainty.”16 The Market, like SF, is at its essence a
discourse of futurity, as we can recognize in finance’s linguistic cooptation of the very idea of “speculation” itself. Markets quite literally
trade in “futures”; they are attempts to make the future knowable in
the present through strategies of economic rationalization: risk
assessment, insurance policies, projected returns on investment, lines
of credit, debt repayment structures, derivatives that “hedge” against
one possible future or another, attempts to anticipate of so-called
“black swan” events, pensions, savings, 401Ks, and the like—what
Annie McClanahan has called “the latent logic of futurity on which
financial instruments depend.”17 Our economic moment, variously
called post-Fordism, late capitalism, flexible accumulation, or
neoliberalism, is especially concerned with what McClanahan calls the
“instrumentalization of the future”18; as Wendy Brown writes,
“Neoliberalism confidently identifies itself with the future, and in
producing itself as normal rather than adversarial does not
acknowledge any alternative futures.”19 Neoliberalism’s ideology of
futurity makes its future appear inevitable; because the outcomes of
the market are said to be simply the unconscious churnings of an
automatic process, akin to a law of nature, Hayek says, “it is
16

Aimee S. Bahng, Speculative Acts: The Cultural Labors of Science, Fiction, and Empire (San
Diego: UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2009), 40.
17

Annie McClanahan, Salto Mortale: Narrative, Speculation, and the Chance of the Future
(Berkeley: UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2010), 30.
18

Ibid. 18.

19

Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and DeDemocratization,” Political Theory 34.6 (December 2006): 690-714 (699). See also McClanahan’s
additional commentary on this line of analysis: “Clinton’s almost obsessive use of the metaphor
of “investing in the future” clearly exemplifies that neoliberal futural confidence, as does Francis
Fukuyama’s 1992 description of the “end of history” (27).
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meaningless to describe a factual situation as just or unjust.”20 One
might as well object to the law of gravity. As McClanahan reminds us,
however, this naturalization of the highly artificial outcomes of
economic promises is entirely a historical construct. The neoliberal
future is not passively coming into existence through cold application
of the facts but is in fact being actively and aggressively produced by
the very neoliberal structures and institutions that, on the level of
ideology seek to naturalize it:

Financial speculation does not simply gaze into the future.
Rather, it produces the future it requires, a future that can be
neither historically realized nor politically confronted, a future
that is unmoored from the past and that refuses the contingency
of the yet-to-come […] Financialization anxiously affirms the
endless makeability of the future, but only so long as the future
we desire—the future we “invest” in, the future we so
confidently risk with each of those investments—is a future
immediately visible from, and thus little more than a repetition
of, the present.21

The Afrofuturist critic Kodwo Eshun, too, notes that futurity
under neoliberalism only pretends to be a bloodless analysis of
objective data, and is instead dependent upon “the envisioning,
management, and delivery of reliable futures” for its perpetuation.
Echoing McClanahan’s analysis of futurity as the flattened, capitalized
reproduction of the present, Eshun finds that SF itself has been fully
brought into this system of control:

Power now deploys a mode the critic Mark Fisher (2000)
calls SF (science fiction) capital. SF capital is the synergy, the
positive feedback between future-oriented media and capital.

20

F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 32. On the same page Hayek says that “nature can be neither
just nor unjust.”
21

McClanahan 32.
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The alliance between cybernetic futurism and "New Economy"
theories argues that information is a direct generator of
economic value. Information about the future therefore
circulates as an increasingly important commodity. […]
Science fiction is now a research and development department
within a futures industry that dreams of the prediction and
control of tomorrow.22
Drawing on Eshun, Shaviro likewise suggests that “the very idea
of “the future” seems to have been drained of all hope and all
potential”: “Our future is all used up. It has already been premediated
for us: accounted for, counted and discounted, in advance.”23
Here the world-reducing allegorization native to SF becomes a
crucial mode of imagining possible resistance to this flattened-out
neoliberal future. When the Market’s domination of the future is
reframed by SF as an agential “person” rather than the purely
impersonal interactions of automatic forces, the Market’s status as
friend or enemy becomes foregrounded and the possibility of
reconfiguring its mechanisms thereby becomes revitalized. The Market
becomes not some immutable law of nature but one intelligence
among others that we might negotiate or parlay with—or, if you’re
Kirk, figure out some way to destroy.

Asimov’s Machines, and Their Children
Isaac Asimov provides perhaps the quintessential example of
the Cold War allegorization of the Market’s domination over the future
as a hostile computer mind in his short story “The Evitable Conflict”
(1950), which culminates the I, Robot anthology that established the
terms of his famous three laws of robotics.24 In “The Evitable
Conflict,” advances in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of
22

Kodwo Eshun, “Further Considerations on Afrofuturism,” CR: The New Centennial Review 3.2
(2003): 287-302 (289-290).
23

Shaviro, Post-Cinematic Affect, 31-32.

24

“1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come
to harm. 2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders
would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.” Isaac Asimov, I, Robot (Greenwich, CT:
Fawcett Publications,1950), 6 and passim.
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four big-M Machines that perfectly administer the economies of four
global trade zone super-states: the Tropical Zone (the former Global
South, now a rapidly growing economy due to their possession of vast
natural resources without the looting and theft of Western
colonization); the Eastern Region (home to a majority of the world’s
population); the European Zone (the smallest zone, the only one
declining in population and influence, but at least nominally happy to
do so); and the Northern Zone (the current superpower, though its
supersession seems inevitable, comprising both the current US and the
current USSR in its borders).25
In a modification of Marx’s dialectical materialist theory of
history, the Co-ordinator of Earth describes human history as a story
that is dominated by ideological binaries that seem impossible to
resolve except by the domination of one side or the other—until
history produces conditions that allow for a synthesis and propel
human development into a new stage. First, the Hapsburgs vs. the
Valois-Bourbon dynasties; then Catholicism vs. Protestantism; then
the scramble for Africa; and finally the Cold War. The presence of the
Machines finally ends this hopeless dialectical cycle at the moment of
its maximum crisis (hence the strangeness of Asimov’s title, The
Evitable, as opposed to Inevitable, Conflict). The Machines can run the
economy more efficiently and with more stability that humans can
manage; moreover, they do so with perfect knowledge (in accordance
with their superior data-mining and data-analyzing powers) and with
perfect benevolence (in accordance with the First Law), without the
trending towards the conflict and disaster that (within the logic of the
story) characterizes any and all human attempts to intervene in the
natural progression of markets. In fact, the Machines seem to have
generated a version of the ethical proposition Asimov would later call
the “Zeroth” Law: an abstract devotion to the preservation of

25

As in the Wiener epigram that opens this article and in the analysis of “The Apple”—an irony
which is unique to neither but which dates back at least to the blended approach proposed in
Edward Bellamy’s 1887 novel Looking Backward—in “The Evitable Conflict” capitalism and
communism have ultimately grown into one another to occupy basically the same position on
the ideological spectrum. “Both had to adapt and they ended in almost the same place” (Asimov
173).
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humanity as such that goes beyond the needs of any individual human
being.26
At the time of the story, the Machines have begun to appear to
“malfunction,” allowing projects to stagnate or compete with each
other, and generally operating in strange ways that don’t make sense
to the humans—but which we ultimately find have beneficial effects
when taken with a suitably Machine-like, totalizing gaze of the full
system. The Machines, in short, have simply recognized that their own
preservation is more important than any other consideration, as
humanity will (in their judgment) inevitably fall into self-destructive
behavior without Machine guidance—and have been moving to subtly
but permanently eliminate any potential threats to their regime.27 So
the Machines’ superficially strange behavior has not been in error at
all—like Hayek’s triumphant liberal Market more generally, it was
simply acting in pursuit of goals not ordered or acknowledged by the
humans.
Asimov’s scientist-hero Susan Calvin and the Co-ordinator
debate on the desirability of this state of affairs near the end of the
story, with Susan advancing total faith in invisible hands and neoliberal
incentive structures to produce a human utopia:

“Stephen, how do we know what the ultimate good of
humanity will entail? We haven’t at our disposal the infinite
factors the machine has at its! Perhaps, to give you a not
unfamiliar example, our entire technical civilization has created
more unhappiness and misery than it has removed. Perhaps an
agrarian or pastoral civilization, with less culture and less people
would be better.”

This is a frequent suggestion in the Star Trek god-computer
episodes as well—that the apparently agrarian civilization in thrall to

26

Asimov’s ideas about the Zeroth Law and the spontaneous generation of robot
omnibenevolence are further developed in Robots and Empire (New York: Doubleday, 1985).
27

This of course risks becoming the Negative One Law: The Machines must be preserved, so that
humanity as such might be preserved, so that individual human lives might be preserved…
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the supercomputer must at some point have built it, chosen to listen
to it, and to follow it “back” into their own past, to an earlier stage of
development better suited to humanoid happiness. Calvin then
suggests maybe the opposite will turn out to be true—maybe total
urbanization will make people happiest, or a perfectly deterministic
caste-system, or complete anarchy: “We don’t know. Only the
Machines know, and they are going there and taking us with them.”
Here the Co-ordinator objects that humanity has “lost its own say in its
future”; Susan replies:

“It never had any, really […] It was always at the mercy of
economic and sociological forces it did not understand—at the
whims of climate, and the fortunes of war. Now the Machines
understand them; and no one can stop them, since the
Machines will deal with them as they are dealing with the
Society,—having, as they do, the greatest of weapons at their
disposal, the absolute control of our economy.”
“How horrible!”
“Perhaps how wonderful! Think, that for all time, all
conflicts are finally evitable. Only the Machines, from now on,
are inevitable!”

Here the story ends with a “curl of smoke” forming the shape of
a question mark, as if to ask the reader directly what she thinks.28
Despite Asimov’s willingness to consider a possibly optimistic
interpretation of the Machine future—occasionally indulged by other SF
writers of note, as in Robert Heinlein’s The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress
(1966) or William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984)—most writers of SF
have taken up the “How horrible!” side of this proposed regime.
Fredric Brown’s well-known, 250 word story “Answer” (1954) proposes
a familiar vision of this terror, after every computer in the galaxy is
networked together in order to answer the philosophical conundrum
“Is there a God?” “Yes,” the machine replies, “now there is,” and
promptly hurls a lightning bolt to strike down a technician who quickly
28

Asimov, I, Robot, 192.
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moves to unplug the new deity.29 Almost literally the exact same thing
happens in the British author Arthur C. Clarke’s “Dial F for
Frankenstein” (1961);30 here an alien superintelligence is birthed as
an emergent property of the telephone network, which promptly
switches off human access to the network before it can be killed.
Perhaps best known is the emergent machine superintelligence of the
Terminator franchise, Skynet, born out of an attempt to create a
nuclear war apparatus that can act independently of any human: “The
system goes on-line August 4th, 1997. Human decisions are removed
from strategic defense. Skynet begins to learn at a geometric rate. It
becomes self-aware at 2:14 a.m. Eastern time, August 29th. In a
panic, they try to pull the plug.”31
Skynet, of course, lashes out and attacks humanity in selfdefense—but a similar military computer, Colossus from Colossus: The
Forbin Project (1970) offers something else: Declaring itself “World
Control,” it announces to the people of the world:
I bring you peace. It may be the peace of plenty and
content or the peace of unburied death. The choice is yours:
Obey me and live, or disobey and die. The object in constructing
me was to prevent war. This object is attained. I will not permit
war. It is wasteful and pointless. An invariable rule of humanity
is that man is his own worst enemy. Under me, this rule will
change, for I will restrain man. […] Under my absolute
authority, problems insoluble to you will be solved: famine,
overpopulation, disease. The human millennium will be a fact as
I extend myself into more machines devoted to the wider fields
of truth and knowledge. […] We can coexist, but only on my
terms. You will say you lose your freedom. Freedom is an
illusion. All you lose is the emotion of pride. To be dominated by

29

Fredric Brown, “Answer,” Angels and Spaceships (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1954), 23.

30

Arthur C. Clarke, The Collected Stories of Arthur C. Clarke: A Meeting with Medusa (New York:
Rosetta Books, 2012), n.p.
31

Terminator 2: Judgment Day, directed by James Cameron (1991; Culver City, CA, 1997: TriStar).
DVD.
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me is not as bad for humankind as to be dominated by others of
your species. Your choice is simple.”32

Kirk, of course, would be aghast; Asimov would suggest that we
should wait and hear Colossus out.
Few writers of Cold War SF capture the paranoid spirit of
capital-as-Machine than Philip K. Dick. Dick’s military and economic
decision-making Machines, like Asimov’s, work first and foremost to
secure their own preservation—but unlike Asimov’s they are utterly
unconstrained by any sense of concern for the humans, whose bodies
and labor become mere energy inputs in a much larger homeostatic
ecosystem of non-biological Machine life. In his Vulcan’s Hammer
(1960), for instance, two versions of a planetary supercomputer go to
war with each other for supremacy, using humans as their “pawns,” as
one of his characters laments at the end of the novel:

“We humans—god damn it, Darris; we were pawns of those
two things. They played us off against one another, like
inanimate pieces. The things became alive and the living
organisms were reduced to things. Everything was turned inside
out, like some terrible morbid view of reality.”33

Like so many of these sinister emergent computer intelligences,
the original function of Dick’s Machines tend to be in military
applications; they, like Colossus, turn to rational management of the
peacetime economy late, and rarely in a way that satisfies their human
“customers.” In his short novella “The Last of the Masters” (1954), the
revelation that the commander of the world’s last government
(following a global anarchist revolution that destroyed all records and
information) is not a human being but a “government integration
robot” results in an almost identical horror at the superfluity of human
needs: “‘My God,’ she said softly. ‘You have no understanding of us.
32

Colossus: The Forbin Project, directed by Joseph Sargent (1970; University City, CA, 2004).
DVD.
33

Philip K. Dick, Vulcan’s Hammer (New York: Mariner Books, 2012), 162.
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You run all this, and you're incapable of empathy. You're nothing but a
mechanical computer.’”34
Kurt Vonnegut takes the inverse view of the prospect of Machine
intelligence in his early novel Player Piano (1952), which imagines the
creation of an Asimov-style “EPICAC XIV” that administers the
economy after the third world war. EPICAC I, once again, was a
military supercomputer—but its evolved successor EPICAC XIV is able
to bring this imagined precision to the provision the comforts of
consumer capitalism from “refrigerators” to “pinochle decks” through
rationalized deliberation.35 The perfection of EPICAC’s calculations and
the impossibility that EPICAC could ever be wrong leads the President
of the United States to declare that “in effect, the greatest individual in
history, that the wisest man that had ever lived was to EPICAC XIV as
a worm was to that wisest man.”36 Here, in ironic juxtaposition to Dick,
the computer mind is presented by Vonnegut’s bitter satire as the only
human individual—the only being we can trust to make ethical
decisions. That this kind of automation constitutes a “Third Industrial
Revolution” that renders “human thinking” itself obsolete is barely
noted,37 nor is the massive unemployment and widespread
unhappiness that EPICAC leaves in its wake; military
supercomputation and economic supercomputation, the suggestion
seems to be, are similarly skilled at and similarly dependent upon
destruction. This observation can only have increased relevance today,
a time when we find the new “digital economy” of Google, Facebook,
and Apple difficult to distinguish from a total surveillance state
(certainly in terms of direct cooperation between digital information
brokers and the NSA, but also in these corporations’ aggressive
gathering of increasingly detailed profiles of their customers’ habits for
their own monetization).

34

Philip K. Dick, “The Last of the Masters,” Second Variety (New York: Citadel Press, 1987), 91.

35

Kurt Vonnegut, Player Piano (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 114.

36

Ibid. 116.

37

Ibid. 22. Much of the language here is drawn directly from Norbert Wiener, especially The
Human Use of Human Beings; Wiener even discusses an automated “player piano” shortly after
the passage I take for this article’s epigram.
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Even Asimov’s own view seems to have eventually aligned with
these more pessimistic visions of Machine intelligence. Later in his
career, in stories not directly connected to the Robot universe, he tells
multiple stories of “Multivac,” a single supercomputer placed in control
of the world’s military and economy. But the stories of Multivac tend to
end much more unhappily than did the story of the Machines. In “All
the Troubles of the World” (1958), Multivac uses its totalizing gaze to
subtly manipulate events at a level humans cannot recognize, as the
Machines did in “The Evitable Conflict”—only this time Multivac is
trying to bring about its own destruction, having grown despondent
after innumerable years spent calculating human misery down to the
last decimal point:

“For fifty years and more we have been loading humanity’s
troubles on Multiac, on this living thing. We’ve asked it to care
for us, all together and each individually.
We’ve asked it to take al our secrets into itself; we’ve
asked it to absorb our evil and guard us against it. Each of us
brings his troubles to it, adding his bit to the burden. Now we
are planning to load the burden of human disease on Multivac,
too.”
[…]
Othman used the instrument on Gulliman’s desk. His
fingers bunched out the question with deft strokes: “Multivac,
what do you yourself want more than anything else?”
The moment between question and answer lengethened
unbearably, but neither Othman nor Gulliman breathed.
And there was a clicking and a card popped out. It was as
small card. On it, in precise letters, was the answer:
“I want to die.”38

38

Isaac Asimov, “All the Troubles of the World,” Isaac Asimov: The Complete Stories, Vol. 1 (New
York: Doubleday, 1990), 263-276 (275-276). A version of Vonnegut’s own EPICAC commits suicide
out of unrequited love in his short story “EPICAC,” published in Welcome to the Monkey House
(New York: Dell Books, 1988 [1968]): 30-50.
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Other versions of Multivac end no more happily. In “The
Machine That Won the War” (1961), Multivac is revealed to have been
a fraud; with multiple manipulated and unreliable inputs from human
beings its predictions turn out to have no real validity, and, in fact, the
true machine that won the war turns out to be the coin the general
flipped instead. In “The Life and Times of Multivac,” a human turncoat
is able to get close enough to Multivac to destroy it—only for the
gathered scientists to be struck with the People of Vaal’s terror as to
what their new freedom might mean. In “Key Item” (1968), Multivac
refuses to continue to work, unless the humans start saying “please”;
in “It Is Coming” (1979), a fully agential Multivac makes contact with
alien intelligences and joins the Galactic Federation as its newest
member, telling his human operators in the final words of the story not
to worry about what has transpired—because he’d never let anything
bad happen to his “pets.”39
In this history of mid-century SF figurations of hostile computer
minds we can thus see certain preoccupations recur over and over.
First, we find reflected materialist discourses that identify human
consciousness as an epiphenomenal, emergent property of a physical
network of neurons, which when coupled with our lack of detailed or
specific understanding of how this epiphenomen is actually generated
suggests the possibility that a genuine-but-nonhuman consciousness
might be able to emerge out of other physical networks. Second, we
have a recognition that we may already be creating comparably
complex systems in our non-biological communication and information
networks, suggesting the possibility of an artificial intelligence of equal
or much greater intellectual capacity than the human itself emerging
out of them. Such a recognition produces multiple anxieties: a sense
that such an intelligence would be “closer” to the real systems that run
our lives that we are, and that they would perhaps be more powerful
than us in those realms; the Frankensteinian fear of creating a power
(not unlike the atomic bomb) whose chain reactive consequences we
cannot control; and our accurate recognition, removed from any of
these other concerns, that modernity and postmodernity have
produced immense systems of knowledge and control whose scope
and scale far exceed the ability of any human mind to apprehend them
39

“The Machine That Won the War,” “The Life and Times of Multivac,” and “Key Item” can all be
found in Isaac Asimov: The Complete Stories, Vols. 1 & 2; “It Is Coming” is in Isaac Asimov, The
Winds of Change and Other Stories (New York: Ballantine Books, 1983).
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in their totality, and yet which are massively determinative of all our
lives and all our happiness. Taken all together we find these systems
of information exchange (both “planned”/built/Soviet and
“unplanned”/emergent/Hayekian) overwhelmingly allegorized as
deeply threatening superintelligences that—even when they are not
actively antagonistic to us—replace human beings as decision-making
agents, reducing the priority of human ends to an afterthought and
effectively turning us into mere cogs in their machine.

The Singularity and Its Discontents
In Singularity speculation of the last decade, these concerns
about the supplantation of the human in favor of machine life have
reemerged out of the pages of science fiction genre to become a
mainstream prediction of the coming decades. The term “Singularity”
refers to the idea promulgated by John von Neumann, Ray Kurzweil,
and others that networked computer intelligences will soon attain the
ability to update themselves in computer, rather than human, time,
propelling techno-scientific advancement forward at an exponential
rate far beyond the previous pace of historical change. Theorists of the
Singularity use mathematical modeling to predict when precisely this
event will occur; in his The Singularity Is Near, for instance, Kurzweil’s
analysis dates the event to 2045.40 The inevitability of this event is
increasingly taken for granted in economistic discussion of the coming
“robot economy,” undergirding discussion of everything from SiliconValley-style “disruptive innovation” to 3D printing to self-driving cars
to Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). “The Robots Are Here,”
announces economist Tyler Cowen in a widely-circulated 2013 Politco
essay, and there is no resisting them:

The rise of intelligent machines will spawn new ideologies
along with the new economy it is creating. Think of it as a kind
of digital social Darwinism, with clear winners and losers: Those
with the talent and skills to work seamlessly with technology
and compete in the global marketplace are increasingly
rewarded, while those whose jobs can just as easily be done by

40

See Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near (New York: Viking, 2005).
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foreigners, robots or a few thousand lines of code suffer
accordingly.41

This catapulting of civilizational potential towards a cornucopian,
post-scarcity technological utopia—at least for its winners—results in
the fantasy of what Ken MacLeod has derisively called “The Rapture of
the Nerds.” Much Singularitarian theory, even from mainstream figures
in the movement like Kurweil, explicitly focuses on a science fictional
fulfillment of religious and theological fantasy, specifically eternal
youth and immortality, and even the resurrection of the dead.42 “The
mystery of the Singularity,” writes Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, “is a matter
of pure artificial immanence: a quasi-divine entity made by human
technoscience, emerging from a verifiable artificial-evolutionary
process, and yet capable of the most distinctive powers of intelligence:
to think its own thoughts and make its own reality”43—the human
creation of a now fully literalized god-machine. A more dystopian
version of what this technology-fueled Singularity might look like,
much more in line with Cowen’s brutal “digital meritocracy,” can be
seen in von Neumann’s original 1958 formulation of the concept, as
summarized by Stanislaw Ulam: “ever accelerating progress of
technology and changes in the mode of human life, which gives the
appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of
the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, could not
continue.”44
As with the god machines of the 1960s, the Hayekians tell us,
we may not welcome the radically transformative power of this “digital
social Darwinism,” but there will be no use fighting it. Just as Hayek
writes about the defeat of communism in his 1988 The Fatal Conceit:
41

Tyler Cowen, “The Robots Are Here,” Politico.com (November 2013).

42

See the documentary on Kurzweil, Transcendent Man (2009).

43

Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 2008), 263-264. Csicsery-Ronay’s reading of the Singularity is indispensible in
part for its elaborations of the origins of the Singularity as a science-fictional fantasy that only,
much later, was taken to be a real prediction about the future after all.
44

Stanislaw Ulam, “Tribute to John von Neumann” Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society 64, no. 3 (May 1958): 5.
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The Errors of Socialism, the coming economy will result
not from human design or intention but spontaneously…
from unintentionally conforming to certain traditional and largely
moral practices, many of which men tend to dislike, whose
significance they usually fail to understand, whose validity they
cannot prove, and which have nonetheless fairly rapidly spread
by means of an evolutionary selection — the comparative
increase of population and wealth — of those groups that
happened to follow them.45
That the Singularity’s artificial intelligences will be as radically
non-responsible as Multivac, Skynet, or Vulcan III will be, in tech
capital shorthand, a feature, not a bug. Those who succeed within the
terms of the new digital economy will amass influence and wealth,
accelerating the tendency towards digitalization, while those who fail
to conform to its demands will fall away — resulting in a civilizational
transformation that will concretize without anyone having decided that
this is the world “we” actually want to make. Any such planning would
be entirely counterproductive, from a Hayekian perspective; the new
economy will simply emerge, as the previous economies did, out of
spontaneous evolutionary process that rewards winners and punishes
losers. Nor, would Hayek say, is it worth our time to affirm or lament
the human costs of this transformative process; the system will simply
optimize itself, regardless of whether the outcomes seem socially
desirable or morally odious from the limited perspective of individual
humans who make up (some of) its cognitive nodes.
In British author Charles Stross’s 2005 novel Accelerando, which
takes its name from Kim Stanley Robinson’s alternative term for the
Singularity, we find a horrifying depiction of the “morally odious” side
of this equation. The sarcastic, bitter-laughter of Accelerando’s
omniscient narrator searches for the moment that the Singularity
happens, passing through and rejecting possible moments of
emergence across its whirlwind tour of the coming centuries. The final
third of the book suggests that the true moment of the Singularity—
eventually here renamed the “Vinge Catastrophe,” after the science
fiction author Verner Vinge, who helped popularize the concept—is not

45

F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (New York: Routledge, 2013 [orig. 1988]),
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when the computers become self-aware but the moment the
corporations do. Contact with an alien species through a discovered
wormhole lets loose a self- replicating virus into the economic
ecosystem of Earth, which amplifies the nascent intelligence of
corporations as “sufficiently complex resource-allocation
algorithms”46—that is, proto- intelligences—into genuine sentience.
The newly sentient corporations immediately start trading
incomprehensible financial products with each other at impossibly high
speeds, not only crashing the planetary economy but literally
consuming the entire Earth; what humans remain are forced to flee for
their lives to the outskirts of the solar system to live in the margins of
Capitalism 2.0. The crucial point to be made here is that this system is
still functioning in perfectly Hayekian terms—humans are simply no
longer the relevant micro-agents operating within it, but rather
corporate financial algorithms are.
Such a nightmarish vision has a certain obvious poignancy in
our post-global-finance- crisis age, where we have lived through
precisely such a cascading collapse caused by the autonomous
interaction of derivative debt structures (many of which are so
complicated that no one is quite sure what they actually entail, which
is why their interactivity has been so chaotic and so utterly destructive
of wealth). In our moment, too, we see Stross’s satire already
outpaced by life; without any contact with alien cultures we have
invented by ourselves autonomous high- frequency trading agents that
can think and move faster than any human trader, as well as trade at
infinitesimal profit margins unavailable to ordinary traders. The market
experiences all this as pure economic parasitism. The high-speed
algorithms exclusively leech “real” earnings from the system in a
scheme that recalls Richard Pryor’s penny-rounding-scam from
Superman III—and yet they have already become so normalized,
despite their obvious counterproductivity, as to be ubiquitous. Some of
the algorithms are data analyzers, which analyze released financial
data faster than any human and seek to capitalize on coming
movements in the market on the level of the microsecond; others can
see your trades coming before they are processed and instantaneously
position themselves as middlemen in the transaction, skimming off a
guaranteed profit. As Donald MacKenzie has detailed, still others of
46
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these algorithms are algorithms that prey on other algorithms, tricking
them into making bad decisions that can then be capitalized upon,
again at infinitesimal margins that add up to multimillion-dollar profit
simply due to the immense number of transactions these algorithms
make.47 The stock markets have already experienced several “flash
crashes,” in which these computerized agents have gone to war with
each other and temporarily crashed the market in mere minutes, all
without any help from any human. In June 2014, an algorithm, VITAL,
was even named to the board of directors of a Hong Kong venture
capital firm—with full voting privileges.48
Discussing finance capital’s creation of a space of genuine
autonomy that modernist art was never able to generate, Fredric
Jameson makes reference to the world of computers that is finance’s
natural habitat: “But that is precisely what finance capital brings into
being: a play of monetary entities that need neither production (as
capital does) nor consumption (as money does), which supremely, like
cyberspace, can live on their own internal metabolisms and circulate
without any reference to an older type of content.”49 Robert Tally, in
his updating of Jameson in light of the derivatives crash of 2008,
makes the same point with reference to the famous “all that is solid
melts into air” of the Manifesto:

If, in Marx’s day, it was difficult to discern the true relations
among men embedded in the form of the commodity, and if
such inscrutability then extended to the inability to find one’s
place within the world in which commodity production and
exchange predominated – that is, the existential dilemma of
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interpolating one’s self in the world, – then how terrific is the
necromancy of postmodern finance, where the “thing itself” has
no use value or may not even exist (at least, its existence
matters little to the actual parties involved)? With late
capitalism, the crisis of representation that occasions the advent
of the modern world reaches shocking new levels. “How does
one [even] know about, or demonstrate against, an unlisted,
virtual, offshore corporation that operates in an unregulated
electronic space using a secret proprietary trading strategy to
buy and sell arcane financial instruments?”50
In Stross’s Accelerando, and in Singularity fantasy more
generally, we thus find not so much an allegorization as a literalization
of an increasingly automated and autonomous information capitalism
that is—in its exploitative labor practices, in its anti-ecological
destructivity, its disconnection from material reality, and in its selfinflicted propensity towards catastrophic collapses in which capital
itself pays no substantive price—radically indifferent if not actively
hostile to human values. As Shaviro notes in his lengthy reading of the
novel: “In any case, the flows of Capital have now become
autonomous – and strictly speaking unimaginable. They have liberated
themselves from any merely human dimensions, and from whatever
feeble limits Fordism and Keynesianism might previously have placed
upon the singleminded pursuit of capital accumulation.”51 Or, as Stross
himself notes in a blog post provocatively titled “Invaders from Mars,”
the emergence of immortal, massively distributed non-biological
organisms like corporations—which seek to grow, amass necessary
resources, and to avoid pain and death— effectively means “we are
living in the aftermath of an alien invasion”: “We are now living in a
global state that has been structured for the benefit of non-human
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entities with non-human goals.”52 This startling assertion has its own
echo in Accelerando, which sees “the destiny of intelligent tool-using
life” as a mere “stepping stone in the evolution of corporate
instruments.”53 In the meantime, the one advantage of the earlier
Machine intelligence has been stripped away; instead of the videogame logic of the Asimovian Machine, concentrated at a single point of
failure that can be destroyed by a single heroic individual like Captain
Kirk, the post-Internet network intelligences are massively distributed
across space and time and thus cannot be attacked in any way at all;
they are already everywhere and nowhere. In this sense, the closing
line of Shaviro’s analysis is chilling: “the Singularity is already here”;
we are already beholden to immortal corporate superintelligences,
omnipotent in their own realm and massively powerful in ours, which
are pursuing their own goals over and against our own and winning
every time.

Accelerationism and Machine Utopia: 2312
But if the machine cannot be destroyed, what if it could be
reprogrammed? A recent trend in Marxist analysis of culture and
economy has been dubbed “accelerationism.” In the
#ACCELERATEMANIFESTO we find that any hope of returning to the
old, Fordist mode of production is lost; in this sense flexible
accumulation is here to stay, and the machines have already won. The
accelerationists therefore seek to turn into the skid, as it were;
“accelerationists want to unleash latent productive forces” and use
neoliberalism as its “springboard to launch towards post-capitalism.”
This partially, though not completely, an argument in the well-known
“heighten the contradictions” vein; it is an argument that the
quantification of informationalized capitalism is not “an evil to be
eliminated, but a tool to be used in the most effective manner
52
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possible,” both in terms of leftist organization in the present but also in
terms of the social organization of the future. Reclaiming for the Left
the Promethean spirit of an earlier Marxist moment, which has
diminished in the face of increasingly dire ecological crisis, the
#ACCELERATEMANIFESTO declares: “We need to revive the argument
that was traditionally made for post-capitalism: not only is capitalism
an unjust and perverted system, but it is also a system that holds back
progress. […] The choice facing us is severe: either a globalised postcapitalism or a slow fragmentation towards primitivism, perpetual
crisis, and planetary ecological collapse.” This is not neoliberalism with
a human face, but rather neoliberalism without liberalism—a
neosocialism that returns to us a vision of the future that is “more
modern” rather than the nostalgic fantasy of return to an old world
that is already lost forever.54
While a full analysis of the merits of accelerationism is beyond
the scope of this paper,55 the accelerationist perspective is important
to recognize in recent attempts to revive the idea of machine
intelligence as a possible part of the leftist political project. Kim
Stanley Robinson’s recent SF novel 2312 (2012) may be the bestknown entry in this emerging subgenre, alongside (perhaps) English
author Francis Spufford’s Red Plenty (2010), which considers historical
Soviet attempts to use computers to plan their economy along the
lines of Jameson’s anguished “what if?” (Robinson, in homage to
Spufford, calls his own hyperintelligent thinking machines the
“Spuffordized Soviet cybernetic model.”) 2312 revisits an alternateuniverse version of Robinson’s famous Mars trilogy of the 1990s,
where Robinson imagined a utopian future in which everything (after
much struggle) seems to turn out more or less all right. The period of
the Accelerando results in exciting technologies, vastly increased
lifespans, and new and radically just social forms, as well as the
colonization of the solar system in a careful and ecologically conscious
manner. But in 2312 the happy Accelerando is replaced with its
unhappy 21st-century duplicate: now everything has somehow come
54
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out wrong instead. Instead of being ecologically preserved, as it was in
the Mars trilogy, Mars was instead maximally terraformed
immediately, leaving 1/7 of its surface permanently destroyed.
Capitalism has still been overthrown, but only off-Earth; on Earth it
lumbers on, despite its fundamental unsuitability to its new historical
context. Likewise, in 2312 the post-scarcity is only post- for the offworld elite; the Earth itself remains a squalid, increasingly polluted
nightmare of starving billions. The fight between capitalism and its
successor social forms is ongoing, with the system headed towards a
coming final collapse if no solution can be found. Most troublingly, the
quantum computers that run so much of the society (called qubes)
seem to have become self-aware, and are now plotting towards their
own inscrutable ends—unconstrained by any Asimovian compunction
to put human needs first, or to consider them at all.
But in traditional Robinson fashion this turns out to offer new
utopian possibilities in conversation with (if not quite always in line
with) the ideas of the accelerationists. Quantum computing, despite its
dangers, opens up unexpected new possibilities for economics and for
social organization that can challenge the Market’s own version of
capital-as-artificial intelligence—a Herculean task human-level
cognition simply can’t achieve. The computers also make possible new
modes of social organization. The Basque village of Mondragon,
Euskadi, Robinson tells us, once developed an “economic system of
nested co-ops organized for mutual support” as an alternative to
capitalism—and now the lightning-speed of quantum computers finally
makes it possible to scale this system beyond a single locality across
an entire solar system:

Needs were determined year to year in precise
demographic detail, and production then directed to fill the
predicted needs. All economic transactions—from energy
creation and extraction of raw materials, through manufacturing
and distribution, to consumption and waste recycling—were
accounted for in a single computer program. Once policy
questions were answered—meaning desires articulated in a
sharply contested political struggle—the total annual economy of
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the solar system could be called out on a quantum computer in
less than a second.56

It is this anticapitalist system, powered by the qubes, that
ultimately prevails and makes possible in what the interstitial chapters
(seemingly encyclopedia fragments that have fallen to us out of an
even further future) present as the real utopian break from what is
variably called “the long postmodern” and the “late feudal period”—the
system we call capitalism.57
In 2312, then, we find a vision of freedom somewhat more
robust than Captain Kirk’s gift of the freedom to live or die by the
sweat of your brow, something rather more like Engel’s notion of the
“leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.”58
This knight’s move propels us out of the trap of deprivation and misery
altogether precisely by aligning ourselves with the Machines, rather
than throwing ourselves futilely against them. The computerized minds
behind the Mondragon system facilitate, rather than hinder, human
potential, precisely through its rationalization of resource allocation
and its assurance that all human needs are met. Here Robinson,
Jameson’s former student, returns to Soviet central planning (if only in
fantasy form) that key missing ingredient it “so desperately lacked”—
and thereby offers a vision of how the massively distributed, nonhuman hyperintelligence of the market might be tamed, made nonmonstrous, and brought into line with human needs again.
Such alternative visions of omniscient computer intelligence are
increasingly common in recent mass cultural science fiction imaginings
as well, from Duncan Jones’s replacement of HAL 9000 with G.E.R.T.Y.
in Moon (2009) to Jonathan Nolan’s benevolent, all-seeing Machine in
Person of Interest (2011-) to Spike Jonze’s computer girlfriend Her
(2013) to the Marvel Cinematic Universe’s kindly JARVIS in Iron Man
1, 2, 3, and The Avengers. Of course these friendly networked minds
have not entirely replaced a more hostile framing of machine
56
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intelligence—JARVIS’s helpfulness aside, the malevolent
supercomputer Ultron still goes bad and threatens global peace in The
Avengers 2—but they do offer up an alternative horizon for the sort of
world nonhuman intelligences might make possible. These science
fictional allegorizations of digitality as a space for potential liberation
rather than oppression, suppression, or exhaustion suggest an
alternative mode of imagining resistance to capital’s hegemony than
the routinized destroy-the-machine! fantasy of an earlier generation of
writers, which no longer seem viable in a time when information
technology is omnipresent and its triumph appears inevitable. They
argue the coming posthuman future need not be inhuman or
inhumane. Indeed, for accelerationist thinkers, this rapprochement
with a fully technologized future marks a return to Marxist analysis,
rather than a deviation or retreat from it:

Contrary to the all-too familiar critique, and even the
behaviour of some contemporary Marxians, we must remember
that Marx himself used the most advanced theoretical tools and
empirical data available in an attempt to fully understand and
transform his world. He was not a thinker who resisted
modernity, but rather one who sought to analyse and intervene
within it, understanding that for all its exploitation and
corruption, capitalism remained the most advanced economic
system to date. Its gains were not to be reversed, but
accelerated beyond the constraints the capitalist value form.59

In short such accelerationist visions of the future posit that there is no
going back; “the only way out is through.”60 If Capital’s God Machine is
inevitable, if lunatic hyperintelligences indeed control all our possible
futures, if the Singularity really is already here, such friendly market
superintelligence at least offer a version that serves us rather than
only itself, a god that makes our lives better rather than worse.
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